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Abstract
We address query-anonymity in the context of wireless sensor networks. Query-
anonymity is the property that the destination of a client’s query is indistinguish-
able from other potential destinations. Prior work has established that this is an
important issue, and has also pointed out that there appears to be a natural trade-
off between query-anonymity and communication-cost. We explore what we call
the limits of this trade-off: what is the communication-cost that is sufficient to
achieve a certain query-anonymity, and what is the communication-cost that we
must necessarily incur to achieve a certain query-anonymity? We adopt an uncon-
ditional notion of query-anonymity that we argue has intuitive appeal. We then
establish the limits of the trade-off. In particular, we show that in wireless sensor
networks which are source-routed, the necessary and sufficient communication-
cost for query-anonymity asymptotically smaller than the diameter of the network
d is a function of d only, and the necessary and sufficient communication-cost for
query-anonymity larger than d is a function of the desired query-anonymity only.
Our result applies to any network topology that is an arbitrary connected undi-
rected graph. We validate our analytical insights empirically, via simulations. In
summary, our work establishes sound and interesting theoretical results for query-
anonymity in wireless sensor networks, and validates them empirically.
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We address query-anonymity in the context of wireless sensor networks. A wire-
less sensor network is a collection of network elements with limited capabili-
ties (e.g., related to computation or power), each of which is typically dedicated
to a particular task, such as recording the temperature or barometric pressure.




Figure 1.1: An example of WSN
Query. The client routes a query packet
to the target of the query displayed as a
grey circle. The target, then, routes a re-
sponse packet back to the client.
The query-anonymity problem arises
when a client, that is outside the wire-
less sensor network, wants to occasionally
query a sensor or node in the network for
its data. However, the client wants the par-
ticular node it queries to be anonymous to
passive eavesdroppers.
This broad scenario is depicted in Fig-
ure 1.1. Query-anonymity has a number of
applications, as prior work [3] discusses.
For example, a company that creates and
maintains sensor networks may provide ac-
cess to such a network to another company,
e.g., one that is interested in searching for
oil. The latter may not want the former to
know in what regions it is interested in. If
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the former is able to profile the sensors in which the latter shows interest, this may
leak information on where oil is likely to be found.
As Figure 1.1 depicts, the client routes its queries to nodes in the network.
We premise that the client is able to directly communicate with one or more of
the nodes. There is then some strategy for routing via which the client is able to
communicate a query-message to, and a response-message from the node it seeks
to query.
Communication comes at a cost. This cost is determined by several choices
and limitations. For example, the nodes in the wireless sensor network may be too
limited to maintain routing tables. In such circumstances, the client is assumed
to be aware of the topology of the network, and specifies a route in messages it
sends to or through the network. This is called source-routing, and is a common
assumption in the context of such networks.
As one may expect, the length of the source-route directly impacts the size of
the network data that is sent. This issue of communication cost is relevant when
we consider query-anonymity. A natural way of providing anonymity is by “hid-
ing in a crowd” [12], or k-anonymity [15]. As we discuss in Chapter 2, when the
nodes in the wireless sensor network may not be trustworthy, for example because
they are owned by a potentially malicious party, there seems to be no option for
the client other than to redundantly query nodes to hide the true destination of its
query. This is akin to hiding in a crowd, and k-anonymity.
1.1 Motivation and the Problem Statement
Prior work [3] has observed, that, in the context of wireless sensor networks, there
seems to be a natural trade-off between the query-anonymity that can be achieved,
and the communication-cost that must be incurred. Our intent in this work is to
study what we call the limits of this trade-off. Specifically, we seek assertions of
the following two forms:
– To achieve query-anonymity a, it is sufficient that we incur a communication-
cost of c.
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– To achieve query-anonymity a, it is necessary that we incur a communication-
cost of c.
To our knowledge, while the existence of the trade-off has been observed in
prior work [3, 7], it has not been studied in the manner we mention above.
One of the first issues that arises when we seek to study this trade-off is: what
is a meaningful, sufficiently precise, quantitative notion of query-anonymity that
we can adopt?
1.2 Contributions
In our paper [1], we have proposed an unconditional notion of query-anonymity.
We will discuss this notion in more depth in Section 3.1. In this body of work, we
heavily employ this notion to meaningfully investigate the limits of the trade-off
between query-anonymity and communication-cost.
The main contribution of this paper is establishing the asymptotic boundaries
of this trade-off when our notion of query-anonymity is applied to any wireless
sensor network that (a) has an arbitrary connected undirected graph topology and
(b) uses source routing as their main routing techniques.
We hypothesize the asymptotic boundaries of this trade-off and proceed to
prove that these boundaries are both sufficient and necessary to achieve any de-
sired level of query-anonymity a. We observe that there exists a simple proto-
col that achieves query-anonymity a (where a is any value from 1 to n and n is
the number of nodes in the network) at a communication cost that is consistent
with our proposed asymptotic boundaries. This proves sufficiency by the way of
construction. We also show that no protocol exists that can achieve some query-
anonymity given a lower communication-cost than the cost described by our pro-
posed asymptotic boundaries. This proves necessity by the way of contradiction.
We validate our assertions on sufficiency via an empirical evaluation (see
Chapter 5). For this, we have built a simulation using Tossim which is a de facto




Before we start our analytical assessment of the trade-off between communication-
cost and query-anonymity in wireless sensor networks, we need to introduce cer-
tain notions and concepts upon which we establish our theretical approach. The
following sections provide the required background with respect to the context of
our work.
2.1 Topology
We model the topology as a graph. A node in the graph corresponds to a region
in the wireless sensor network. We make the same assumptions as prior work
regarding sensors within a region [3]. A sensor is in exactly one region, and a
region contains one or more sensors. One of the sensors in a region plays the
role of region-head, and it disseminates queries and aggregates responses for the
region. Thus, it is meaningful to model a region as a node; this node can be seen
as the region-head for the region displayed as red circles in Figure 2.1.
An edge in the graph corresponds to whether a node is able to communicate
directly with another node. By direct communication, we mean that if node u
has an edge to node v, then when node u transmits something, node v receives it.
Given that a node represents a region, some routing of messages within a region
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is needed for a node to communicate with another node. This level of detail is not
relevant to our work, and therefore, as in prior work [3] on query-anonymity, we
do not model it.
WSN Topology Graph
Figure 2.1: Nodes within each region communicate only with the region-heads (shown
in red). Region-heads, on the other hand, communicate with one another to route queries
through the network. We model each region (region-head along with other regional nodes)
as a graph node and the communication channels between the region-heads as graph
edges.
For entirety of this document, we consider undirected edges only — that is,
node u is able to communicate directly to v if and only if v is able to communicate
directly to u.
2.2 Protocol, query and response
A protocol, in the context of this work, comprises messages for sequences of
query-response exchanges between the client and one or more nodes. The client
sends out a query packet. A query packet contains a query, and some control
information (e.g., source-routing). A query identifies one or more destinations,
each of which is a node. We assume that the nodes are uniquely identified (e.g. a
16-bit node ID).
Each node that receives a query packet with a query addressed to it sends
a response packet to the client. A response packet contains some constant-size
information per node and some control information.
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Prior work [3] proposes notions of query-anonymity that are characterized in
the context of sequences of queries, rather than a single query only. To place
our work in the same context, we say that a protocol may allow for sequences
of queries rather than a single query only. We model this in a straightforward
way — a query packet from the client may comprise a sequence of query packets,
each of which contains a query and control information as characterized above.
In Chapter 4, we introduce and describe our Disjoint Anonymity Sets(DAS) proto-
col which is a wireless sensor network protocol that uses source routing and can
achieve any level of query-anonymity desired by the user.
Capabilities of a node
As our focus is wireless sensor networks, in which nodes are constrained, we
need to clarify the capability that we associate with each node. Various choices
affect the capabilities a node is assumed to have. For example, in a source-routed
wireless sensor network, the only things a node needs to be able to do are:
1. Receive and transmit packets of bounded but variable size.
2. Read and manipulate the content of packets it receives i.e. inspect the packet
for control information and strip/attach data from/to the packet.
3. Perform simple algorithms that can be expressed by a general-purpose pro-
gramming language such as C and be executed on a general purpose micro-
processor.
2.3 Threat Model
Our attacker is a passive eavesdropper who is able to observe every protocol
exchange, including the contents of packets. This is the customary honest-but-
curious threat model [9, 10]. We adapted this threat model as follows:
The client trusts itself only from the standpoint of disclosure. However, the at-
tacker is aware of any algorithms that the client uses to achieve query-anonymity.
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We discuss this further in Section 2.4. The attacker may “own” the wireless
sensor network such that she can view everything that occurs within it along with
any communication. The attacker may perform traffic- or other pattern-analysis
with her observations. However, the attacker does not disrupt the functioning of
the wireless sensor network, or any communication.
This is a strong eavesdropper in the context of query-anonymity, and certainly
subsumes other threat models, such as ones in which components of the wireless
sensor network are trusted, that some prior work adopts [14]. We emphasize, in
the context of our threat model, that our interest is in query-anonymity only, and
not, for example, the integrity of responses or availability of the network. It is
likely that for such additional security requirements, we need to trust components
of the wireless sensor network.
There is also the question as to whether our results apply to an active attacker,
that is, an attacker that modifies a client’s query-packet after it leaves the client, or
modifies a response-packet on its way back to the client. We point out that our in-
terest is in analyzing the trade-off between query-anonymity and communication-
cost, and not in proposing novel approaches for achieving query-anonymity. The
main issue that arises with an active attacker is whether a certain level of query-
anonymity is achieved for the client in the presence of such an attacker, or even
what a meaningful notion of query-anonymity is in such scenarios.
These are certainly interesting and challenging technical questions, and it is
likely that we can adapt ideas from the work on mix networks [4] for these pur-
poses. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
On the futility of encryption
Given our threat model above, approaches that use encryption in a manner that
components of the wireless sensor network must be trusted to keep a key secret
do not work. Some information must be revealed to the nodes in the network so
they can be queried. For example, when a node receives a query packet, it must
be able to determine from the packet whether it is a destination of a query that is
in the packet. This applies to every node, and every collection of nodes.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that in the context of this literature, the
attacker is mainly interested in the target of the query and not necessarily its con-
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tent. Encryption only hides the content of a packet but since WSNs use a shared
medium communication channel the destination of a packet is not strictly a prop-
erty of its content. The attacker can simply observe the order in which participat-
ing nodes broadcast the packet along its path and make a calculated guess about its
ultimate destination. The act of broadcasting can be observed by a radio receiver
and does not require any cryptanalysis.
2.4 Quantitative Anonymity
Given our discussions on “thread model” in the previous Section 2.3, the only
query-anonymity we can expect is from requiring the client to query nodes redun-
dantly, in addition to those that it intends to query. Thus, we expect that every
query comprises one or more true destinations, and zero or more bogus desti-
nations. This is not surprising of course, and underlies approaches that achieve
k-anonymity and its variants in the context of data stores [15]. In our work, how-
ever, we only focus on queries that contain only one true destination and zero or
more bogus destinations.
As we characterize towards the start of this chapter above, a query comprises a
set of destination nodes. An attacker can observe a query and the destination nodes
that comprise it. The attacker is also aware of any algorithms the client may use to
choose bogus destinations. For example, the client may choose bogus destinations
uniformly at random from those nodes that are not true destinations [3]. However,
the attacker does not know which destinations are bogus, and which are true in a
query (If she did, no query-anonymity can be achieved).
Consider the case that there is only one true destination in a query. Then, the
maximum query-anonymity corresponds to the case that the true destination is
indistinguishable from all of the other n− 1 nodes. The minimum corresponds to
the case that it is uniquely distinguishable. Given this, it seems natural to perceive
query-anonymity as a probability in the interval [1/n, 1]. This is consistent with
prior work on query-anonymity in wireless sensor networks [3], and broader prior
work, on anonymity [6, 13].
In our characterization of query-anonymity (see Definition 1 in Section 3.1),
we simply use the inverse of this probability as the measure. That is, given an
8
a = 1 a = 3 a = 5
Figure 2.2: An example demonstrating various degrees of query anonymity with true
destinations as grey and bogus destinations as blue. Note that true and bogus destination
are not necessarily adjacent.
n-node wireless sensor network, query-anonymity lies in [1, n]. The semantics of
1 is that we have no query-anonymity (the true destination is uniquely distinguish-
able). The semantics of n is that we have the maximum query-anonymity (the true
destination is indistinguishable from any of the other n − 1 nodes). Throughout




Throughout this chapter, we will introduce, explore and prove various aspects
of the theory behind our assertions regarding the asymptotic boundaries that de-
scribes the nature of the trade-off between communication cost and query anonymity.
This includes assessment of previous works and defining and describing various
notions that are required by our theoretical assessments of the problem and ulti-
mately proving our claims.
3.1 Query-a-anonymity
Cabunar et al. in their work [3], propose two notions of query-anonymity: tempo-
ral and spatial anonymity. In work that is currently under review [1], we point out
that these notions are deficient and fall short of describing the essence of query-
anonymity in the context of wireless sensor networks. In this body of work, we
adopt a definition of query-anonymity [1] which is an unconditional notion of
query-anonymity that we call query-a-anonymity. This notion can be seen as an
extension of the work of Serjantov and Danezis [13]. We discuss the differences
in Chapter 7 on related work.
Definition 1 (Query-a-anonymity). We say that a query-response protocol achieves
query-a-anonymity, or query-anonymity of a, if for every a ∈ [1, n], for each
di ∈ D = {d1, . . . , dn}, there exists Di ⊆ D where |Di| ≥ a and di ∈ Di, such
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that an attacker, who is characterized as an algorithm A, is unable to win the
following game.
1. The attacker chooses destinations X ⊆ Di, for some i ∈ [1, n] such that
|X| = k ∈ [1, a]. The attacker sends X to the client.
2. The client chooses some dl ∈ X uniformly at random and constructs a
query q such that dl ∈ d(q). The client then runs an instance of the protocol
with the query q.
3. The attacker must now identify which amongst the members of X the desti-
nation dl chosen by the client in Step (2) above was.
The client wins if the attacker’s probability of correctly identifying dl in Step (3)
above is ≤ 1/k for all k ∈ [1, a]. Otherwise, the attacker wins.
Our notion of anonymity above is unconditional. We do not constrain the
attacker A in any way than to require that it is an algorithm. In particular, the
attacker may have access to any information he wants before he starts the game.
This includes, for example, any algorithms the client may adopt to generate the
set Di and the choice dl in Step (2), and the dl choices in Step (2) that the client
has made in prior runs of the protocol.
3.2 Communication Cost
We characterize communication-cost in a natural way as follows. Transporta-
tion of a constant (i.e., Θ(1)) amount of data over one hop of the wireless sensor
network is considered constant communication-cost. Consider the example illus-
trated in Figure3.1. Suppose the client communicates directly with m1 only, and
seeks to send a packet to the node md over a shortest-path. With source-routing,
the route must be specified by the client as control information in the outgoing
packet. The nodes along the path are labelled m1,m2, ...,mi, ...md−1,md in the
order that the packet visits them.




m1, m2 md-1, md 
m1 md-1 md m2 
...m2 md-1, md 
md 
md-1, md 
Figure 3.1: An example of a source-routed query traveling from the client to the target
node md. At each hop, the size of the query decreases by one unit of routing information.
entry that corresponds to it from the source-route when it receives it, over the first
hop, we transmit a packet of size Θ(d). Over the second hop, we transmit a packet
of size Θ(d−1) and so on, until a constant-sized packet arrives at nodemd . Thus,
the total cost of sending the packet is Θ(d) + Θ(d− 1) + ...+ Θ(1) = Θ(d2).
Note that whether a node strips its entry from the source-route or not, the
communication-cost remains Θ(d) + ... + Θ(d) = Θ(d2). We point out also that
the asymptotic cost does not change based on other, mundane, aspects we may
change with how the query- response protocol works. For example, consider the
following two alternatives to how a node that is queried communicates a response
back to the client. It may send the response as a separate packet, or it may piggy-
back the response in the query packet, which presumably contains a source-route
back to the client. In section 4.2.2, we will further elaborate on why these two
options are equivalent with respect to the asymptotic communication cost. This is
the case even if we query a set of nodes, rather than a single node.
3.3 Proof Strategy
As we mention in Section 1, our assertions are of two types:
1. communication-cost c is sufficient to achieve query-anonymity of a
2. communication-cost c is necessary to achieve query-anonymity of a.




Figure 3.2: A simplified example of
the DAS protocol. We show the true
destination of the client’s query (grey),
and two other nodes (blue) that the client
also queries so an attacker is unable
to distinguish the true destination from
them.
Our approach to proving an assertion of
type (1) above is by construction. That is,
we provide a protocol for which we show
analytically that it achieves anonymity a,
and incurs a cost of only c. We now
briefly discuss the protocol, which we call
the protocol with disjoint anonymity sets
(the DAS protocol), and establish that it
achieves Query anonymity a. The detailed
description of DAS protocol is provided in
chapter 4.
The DAS protocol is simple, and there-
fore has intuitive appeal. It is, how-
ever, somewhat surprisingly powerful, as
we show in the remainder of this paper.
It achieves Query anonymity a, and does
so with optimal cost. The DAS protocol
works as follows:
• The client partitions the n WSN nodes (each of which is a possible des-
tination of a query) into bn/ac disjoint sets S1, . . . , Sbn/ac each of size ∈
[a, 2a− 1]. We call each set Sm an anonymity set.
• When the client wants to query node di, it identifies the set Sm to which di
belongs, and constructs a query q with destination set d(q) = Sm. It issues
the query q and receives the response.
We show this pictorially in Figure 3.2. In the figure, the node shaded grey is
the client’s true destination. Presumably, the client has placed that node in the
same partition as the two nodes colored blue. Therefore, the client queries all
three nodes when it intends to query the node shaded black only. We now make
an assertion regarding the query-anonymity that the DAS protocol achieves.
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Theorem 1. The DAS protocol achieves query-anonymity a.
Proof. In Definition 1, we setDi to the Sm from the DAS protocol which contains
di. For anyX ⊆ Di = Sm of size k ∈ [1, a] that the attacker chooses in Step (1) of
Definition 1, the client, under the DAS protocol, simply queries all the nodes in Sm
in Step (2) of Definition 1. Note that we query Sm for every choice of dl ∈ X ⊆
Sm that the client chooses in Step (2). The attacker’s probability of identifying the
dl ∈ X that the client chooses in Step (2) is 1/|X| = 1/k, notwithstanding any
prior knowledge he has, provided the client chooses dl randomly.
An observation we can make from the proof of Theorem 1 above is that the
manner in which we construct the disjoint anonymity sets is inconsequential to
the Query anonymity that the DAS protocol achieves. This property is important
in future sections in which we consider the trade-off between cost and Query
anonymity. If we have a query Q that contains two nodes that are far apart in the
WSN topology, then it can be expensive to route packets in order to query both
nodes. Consequently, we need to construct anonymity sets in a manner that does
not compromise the Query anonymity that is achieved, but optimizes cost. We
make our observation precise via the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the anonymity sets are disjoint and of size at least a each, the DAS
protocol achieves Query anonymity a.
Necessity
Our approach to proving that cost c is necessary to achieve Query anonymity
of a, (i.e., an assertion of type (2) above), is by contradiction. We assume that
there exists a protocol that achieves Query anonymity awith a cost less than c. We
then derive a contradiction. Usually, the contradiction we derive is that with such
a low cost, the client is unable to even communicate with every node in the WSN,
let alone do so while simultaneously achieving the desired Query anonymity.
The following observation for a lower-bound for achieving Query-anonymity
of a is often useful in our proofs for necessity.
Theorem 2. In Step (2) of Definition 1, to achieve Query-a-anonymity, it must be
true that |d(q)| ≥ k.
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Proof. By contradiction: assume otherwise. If the attacker guesses randomly that
one of the destinations in d(q) is dl, the attacker’s probability of success is >1/k.
3.4 Cost vs. Anonymity
We now consider the trade-off between query-anonymity and communication-cost
in an n-node WSN with any arbitrary topology and with source-routing as its
routing method. As we mention in Section 2.1, a topology, to us, is an undirected,
connected graph.
For the cost that is necessary to achieve query-anonymity a, as we mention
in Section 3.3, we use contradiction. For the cost that is sufficient for query-
anonymity of a, we rely on the DAS protocol, with the anonymity sets in it con-
structed a particular way. As we observe in the previous section in the context of
Theorem 1, this does not compromise the level of query-anonymity we achieve.
Therefore, in this section, we will also explain the particular manner in which we
construct anonymity sets for DAS protocol.
We adopt the following terminology that is customary in computing [5]. A
tree is an acyclic, undirected, connected graph. A spanning tree of a connected
undirected graph G is a subgraph of G that is a tree of all of G’s nodes. A rooted
tree is a tree in which one of its nodes is perceived as the root, and the other nodes
as its descendants. Henceforth, when we use the term tree, we mean a rooted tree.
A leaf is a node in a tree that has no children. The height of a node in a tree is the
distance (number of edges) from the node to its farthest leaf. The height of a tree
is the height of its root. And finally, if h is the height of a tree and hu is the height
of node u in it, the depth of the node u is h− hu.
We first seek to establish Theorem 3 below, regarding the existence of a par-
ticular kind of path through nodes for an arbitrary topology. Before we get to
Theorem 3, we establish the following lemma that helps prove that theorem.
Lemma 2. Given a connected undirected graph G = 〈V,E〉 with |V | = n, there
exists a node u ∈ V and a path u  u that traverses every node in V at least
once and is of length O(n).
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Proof. We first construct a spanning tree, T of G, and adopt some r ∈ V as its
root. This r serves as the node u in the statement of our lemma. We can now
traverse T the following way: starting at r, we visit a node, then recursively each
of its children, and then return to the node. Such a traversal constructs a path
in which every node is visited at least once, and every edge is traversed at most
twice, once in the downward direction and once back upwards. As the number of
edges in the tree is O(n), the path is of length O(n).
Theorem 3. Given a connected undirected graph G = 〈V,E〉 of n vertices, there
exists a partition of V into disjoint sets S1, . . ., Sbn/ac each of size ∈ [a, 2a − 1]
for a ∈ [1, n], such that given any such set Si, there exists u ∈ Si such that there
is cycle u u of length Θ(|Si|) that traverses every vertex in Si.
Algorithm 1 Procedures for constructing anonymity sets in the DAS protocol
1: procedure ConstructAllS(T ,a)
2: n← |V [T ]|
3: for all i ∈ [1, bn/ac] do
4: |Si| ←
{
a if i ∈ [1, bn/ac − 1]
n− a (bn/ac − 1) otherwise
5: Ti ← Ti−1 with nodes from Si−1 removed ( special case: T0 = T ).
6: MakeLeftHeavy(Ti)
7: Si ← ConstructOneS(Ti, |Si|)
8: procedure MakeLeftHeavy(T ′)
9: Upon return, T ′ has the following property: given any
10: node in T ′, suppose its children from left to right
11: are c1, . . . , ck. Then, height(c1) ≥ . . . ≥ height(ck).
12: procedure ConstructOneS(T ′, n′)
13: Post-order traverse T ′
14: Return the first n′ nodes we encounter
The proof for the above theorem relies on the procedure ConstructAllS in Al-
gorithm 1, which invokes as subroutines the procedures MakeLeftHeavy and Con-
structOneS. We first describe the procedure, and then establish properties for them
that help us with the proof for Theorem 3.
The procedure ConstructAllS takes as inputs a tree T of n nodes and an integer
a ∈ [1, n]. In Line 2, we set up an iterator, i, which takes on values 1 through
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bn/ac in turn. We first specify the size |Si| for the set Si we intend to construct in
the ith iteration. In Line 4, we first specify Ti to be T , but with all the nodes from
S1∪ . . .∪Si−1 that were identified in prior iterations removed. As Lemma 4 below
asserts, Ti is a tree of at least a nodes. We then invoke MakeLeftHeavy on Ti in
Line 5, and then ConstructOneS with second argument the size of Si we wish to
construct.
In MakeLeftHeavy, we reorder the children of every node so that they are
ordered left to right in non-increasing height. That is, the leftmost child has the
maximum height amongst all the node’s children, the next child to the right has
height at most the height of its left sibling and so on. A simple algorithm to do
this is the following. We maintain an integer for each node, that is initialized to 0.
We first walk up the tree starting at the leaves and update each node’s height. We
then walk down the tree starting at the root and reorder the children of each node
based on their height. The algorithm runs in time linear in the size of the tree. It
has a space-complexity of O(n log n), where n is the number of nodes in the tree,
because the height of the tree is at most n−1, and therefore at each node, we need
to maintain at most log n bits to record its height.
Finally, in ConstructOneS, we are given a tree T ′ and a positive integer n′,
where n′ is at most the number of nodes in T ′. We perform a post-order traver-
sal of T ′ and return the first n′ nodes we encounter. In a post-order traversal,
we recursively visit the children of a node from left to right, and then visit the
node. Figure 3.3 demonstrates how this process divides the network into disjoint
anonymity sets.
We now first present lemmas for properties of our three algorithms, and then
prove Theorem 3.
Lemma 3. Suppose T ′ is a tree, and n′ is an integer that is at most the number of
nodes in T ′. Then, removing the n′ nodes returned by ConstructOneS(T ′, n′) from
T ′ results in a tree.
Proof. In a post-order traversal, we visit all the descendants of a node before the
node itself. Therefore, a node is in the set of n′ nodes only if all of its descendants
are also in that set.
Lemma 4. In Line 4 of ConstructAllS, for all i, Ti is a tree of at least |Si| nodes,
for |Si| as specified in Line 3.
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Figure 3.3: An example of workings of ConstructAllS and its subroutines MakeLeft-
Heavy and ConstructOneS. We adopt n = 12 and a = 3 which results in three anonymity
sets of blue , green and yellow with sizes 4, 4 and 4 respectively. We construct graph’s
rooted BFS tree and repeatedly apply MakeLeftHeavy and ConstructOneS in that order
until all the nodes are grouped into desired anonymity sets.
Proof. By induction on i. For the base case, i = 1, and as a ≤ n, T1 = T
has at least |S1| nodes and is a tree. For the step, we assume that the assertion
is true for all i ∈ [1, k − 1]. We first show, for i = k, that Ti has at least |Si|
nodes. We have two cases. (1) k<bn/ac. As |S1| = . . . = |Sk−1| = a and
k ≤ bn/ac, a(k − 1) ≤ n − a, and Tk has at least a nodes. (2) k = bn/ac. As
|S1| = . . . = |Sk−1| = a, we remove a (bn/ac − 1) nodes from T in Line 4 of
ConstructAllS to get Tk, and therefore Tk has |Sk| = n − a (bn/ac − 1) nodes as
desired.
We are left with establishing that Tk is a tree. For this, we first observe that
from the induction assumption, Tk−1 is a tree. And in Line 4 of ConstructAllS,
when i = k, Tk is Tk−1 but with the nodes from Sk−1 removed. Sk−1 is the result of
the invocation of ConstructOneS(Tk−1, |Sk−1|), and therefore by Lemma 3 above,
Tk is a tree.
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Lemma 5. Construct the graph ti = 〈Vi, Ei〉 as follows, for a set Si output by
ConstructAllS(T, a). Start with ti as the smallest subtree of T that contains all
the nodes in Si. Recursively remove all leaves from ti that are not in Si. Then, the
following are true:
(a) ti is a tree
(b) |Vi| = O(|Si|).
Proof. To establish (a), we merely observe that we start with ti being a tree, and
recursively remove leaves only, and therefore the resultant ti is also a tree.
To establish (b), we first observe that ti is a subtree of Ti in the algorithm Con-
structAllS. We consider ti as a subtree of Ti immediately after Line 5 is executed
in ConstructAllS. Let r be the root of ti. If r has no children or has only one child,
then all the nodes of ti are in Si are we are done. Otherwise, that is, if r has more
than one child, then, only the rightmost branch of r, which is a simple path, can
contain any nodes not in Si. This is a consequence of the post-order traversal we
conduct in ConstructOneS to determine Si. Let n¬Si be the number of nodes in ti
that are not in Si. Then n¬Si ≤ |Si|/2 because ti is “left heavy,” that is, the de-
scendants of its root r are ordered in non-increasing height as we go left to right.
Thus, |Vi| ≤ 2|Si|, and therefore |Vi| = O(|Si|).
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h1 < a h1 < h2
|T'| < a
Figure 3.4: An example of a span-
ning subtree returned after applying on
instance of ConstructOneS which repre-
sents some anonymity set Si of size a.
Figure 3.4 can help us better under-
stand the proof for part (b) of Lemma 5.
Proof (Theorem 3) . We first construct a
spanning tree T of G, and invoke
ConstructAllS(T, a). For each Si, we have
a ti as in Lemma 5 above. As ti is a tree,
it is connected, and therefore by Lemma 2,
we have the desired proof.
We are now able to make assertions re-
garding the limits of the trade-off between
anonymity and cost for any WSN of ar-
bitrary topology with source-routing. In
the following, the diameter of a graph is
the longest amongst the shortest distances
(number of edges) across all pairs of nodes. That is, if G = 〈V,E〉 is a connected
undirected graph with V = {1, . . . , n}, and di,j is the shortest distance between i
and j, then G’s diameter d = maxi,j∈V {di,j}.
Theorem 4. To achieve query-anonymity a ∈ [1,Θ(d)] in a source-routed WSN
whose diameter is d, a worst-case cost of:
• O(d2) is sufficient, and,
• Ω(d2) is necessary.
Proof. Sufficiency: consider the worst-case cost in the DAS protocol of achieving
query-anonymity a ∈ [1,Θ(d)]. The worst-case node to be queried is of distance
d from the client, and belongs to some anonymity-set Si. This set is associated
with a node u as in Theorem 3. Consider the route as being split into 3 pieces:
(1) from the client to u, (2) from u through all the nodes in Si back to u, and, (3)
from u to the client. (1) and (3) are each of length O(d). By Theorem 3, (2) is of
length O(|Si|) = O(d). Therefore, the total route-length is O(d). And thus, the
worst-case cost is O(d2).
Necessity: assume otherwise for the purpose of contradiction. That is, as-
sume that there is a protocol that achieves query-anonymity of a with cost o(d).
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Consider the worst-case cost of sending 1-bit to a node in the WSN in terms of
communications-cost. A node that actualizes such a worst-case scenario is a node
that is of distance d from the client, and therefore the length of the source-route
from the client to that node is initially Ω(d). Thus, to transport the bit costs Ω(d2)
thereby contradicting the assumption.
Theorem 5. To achieve query-anonymity a ∈ [Θ(d), n] in a source-routed WSN
whose diameter is d, a worst-case cost of:
• O(a2) is sufficient, and,
• Ω(a2) is necessary.
Proof. Sufficiency: as in the proof for Theorem 4 above, in the DAS protocol,
we split the route into three pieces: (1) a route from the client to the node u from
Theorem 3 associated with an anonymity set Si, (2) a route of length Θ(|Si|)
through the members of Si, from u to u, and, (3) the route back from u to the
client. The total route-length is O(2d + |Si|) = O(2d + a) = O(a) because
|Si| ∈ [a, 2a), and d = O(a). Thus, the total cost is O(a2).
Necessity: From Theorem 2, we know that the client must choose d(q) of
size ≥ a in Step (2) of Definition 1. That is, the source-route the client specifies
must include at least a distinct hops. Consider the communication cost of trans-
porting such a source-route. We have “at least” 1 hop across which a packet of
size Θ(a) traverses, “at least” 1 hop across which a packet of size Θ(a − 1) tra-
verses, and so on. Thus, the total cost is Θ(a) + Θ(a− 1) + . . .+ Θ(1) = Θ(a2).
Thus, a cost of Ω(a2) is necessary.
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The special case of square-grid topology number of nodes = n
n- 1
d
Figure 3.5: An example of a WSN of
size n with square grid topology. Each




Square grid topology is one of the
widely used classes of WSN topolo-
gies. An interesting property of these
topologies, as the direct result of apply-
ing the Theorem 4 to such networks, is
that the communication cost of achieving
anonymity a, when a ∈ [1,Θ(√n)], de-
pends only on n where n is the number
of nodes in the network. The reason be-
hind this characteristic is that the diame-
ter of a network with square grid topology
is a function of the size of the network as
shown in Figure 3.5. The longest short-
est path resides between the two nodes on
the opposing corners of the grid and is laid
along any two adjacent sides of the square. If the size of the grid is n, each side
can be traversed in
√
n− 1 hops. Therefore, the diameter d is exactly 2(√n− 1).
Thus, we proceed to establish the following corollary:
Corollary 1. To achieve query-anonymity a ∈ [1,Θ(√n)] in a source-routed,
square-grid WSN of size n, a worst-case cost of:
• O(n) is sufficient, and,
• Ω(n) is necessary.
Proof. The proof is very straightforward. We know that the diameter of a square
grid WSN is 2(
√
n − 1) which is Θ(√n). We simply substitute d in Theorem 4
for this value. We get O(d2) = O([2(
√
n − 1)]2) = O(4n − 8√n − 4) = O(n).
We can apply the same logic for the “necessary” property Ω(·).
As for a ∈ [Θ(√n), n], the asymptotic cost is exactly the same as it would be
in any arbitray topology i.e. Θ(a2) . However, this result is less interesting than
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Corollary 1. Our work that is currently under review [1] presents a more in depth
discussion of this special-case.
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Chapter 4
Disjoint Anonymity Sets (DAS)
Protocol
In this chapter, we describe various aspects of DAS protocol that has not been
discussed so far and paint a broader picture of DAS’s behaviour in a WSN. This
chapter is a precursor to Chapter5 and helps us eliminate any uncertainty that
could arise when assessing the experimental results.
4.1 Anonymity Set Arrangement
In Section 3.4, we described how we apply ConstructAllS in order to divide the
WSN into disjoint sets. However, we made no assertions about the size of indi-
vidual sets other than for each set Si, |Si| ∈ [a, 2a − 1] where a is the desired
anonymity. If there are to be k disjoint sets in the network, ConstructAllS naively
allocates a nodes for each of the first k − 1 sets and assigns the remaining nodes
to the kth set. However, we wish to distribute WSN nodes as evenly as possible
among the anonymity sets in cases where the size of the network n is not divisible
by query-a-anonymity a (i.e. a - n). We do this by calculating the size of each
individual anonymity set before we divide the network. Once we establish the
size of each individual anonymity set, only then we advance to divide the network
accordingly.
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In order to divide the network evenly, we initially set the size of each anonymity
set Si to a. Doing so, we assure that each set provides the anonymity of at least a.
Next, we calculate the number of unallocated nodes rem = n( mod k). Finally,
we increment the size of S1, S2 . . . , Sk in round-robin manner for rem repetitions.
This procedure is demonstrated in Algorithm2.
Algorithm 2 Uniform distribution of nodes among anonymity sets
1: procedure arragneAnonSets(a, n)
2: k ← bn/ac . k is the number of anonymity sets
3: ∀Si where i ∈ [1, k] : |Si| ← a
4: rem← n( mod ak)
5: for i ∈ [1, rem] do
6: idx← i( mod k) . Adjusting the index for round-robin
7: |Sidx| ← |Sidx|+ 1
By dividing the network in this manner, the difference between the size of
any two anonymity sets is at most 1. Therefore, we do not compromise the cost
of one query for the benefit of another. Doing do, we avoid the situations in
which the largest set resides furthest from the client which can result in significant
communication overhead.
Anonymity set arrangement for square-grid topology
In WSNs with square grid topologies, there is a more efficient way of arrang-
ing the anonymity sets which results in a smaller cost for each query. For square
grid networks, we can always arrange the anonymity sets so that each set Si can
be traversed in exactly |Si| “consecutive” hops. To form such an arrangement,
first, we calculate the size of each anonymity set Si as described above. Instead
of applying ConstructAllS to the network graph, we order the graph nodes in the
fashion which we refer to as a snake-walk throughout the graph as shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. We, then, assign the first |S1| nodes of this ordering to the set S1, the next
|S2| to the set S2 and so on.
We traverse each Si in the same ordering provided by its corresponding portion
of our snake-walk which guarantees exactly |Si| hops. This is a better arrangement
compared to the arrangement provided ConstructAllS which might result in a walk
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Figure 4.1: In this example the size of the network is n = 9 and the anonymity is a = 2
which results in anonymity sets of sizes 3, 2, 2 and 2. The snake-walk through the graph
gives us the ordering shown above from which we allocate nodes to each set according to
their sizes.
reduces the overall length of the path that a query takes which means less routing
information required per packet. This eventually means smaller cost per query.
We use this arrangement for square grid WSNs thought out our experimentation.
4.2 Communication Protocol
In this section, we accurately describe how DAS protocol operates in order to
guide the query through the network and collect the required data.
4.2.1 DAS Packet Format
Our implementation of DAS uses the packet format illustrated in Figure 4.2. The
first field of the packet is the header. This field consists of two segments. The
first segment is 16 bits which indicates the ID of the target node. By the “target
node”, we mean the target of the inter-node transmission at the link layer and not
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the ultimate destination of the query. This segment gets updated for each hop
throughout the packet’s route. More so, even though the node IDs are 15 bits, we
used 16 bits since it is much more convenient to access this memory arrangement
and also it makes it easier to avoid segmentation errors at the hardware level.
The second segment is also 16 bits which dictates what action the target node
should perform alongside the parameter/s required for that action. The 2 most
significant bits in this segment represent the action and the remaining 14 bits are
reserved for the parameter/flags. The most important action in this context is the
“routing” action for which the parameter is the size of the payload in bytes ( i.e.
the combined length “route” and the “data” portions of the payload in bytes).
There are other actions that are used in the initial phase of the simulation but the








16 bits 16 bits
DAS Packet
Figure 4.2: Header field of the packet (blue) contains one 16-bit segment to indicated
the target and another 16-bit segment reserved for instructions and required parameters.
The payload field of a DAS packet consists of route buff (green) which is a16-bit array
that contains routing information and finally the data array (orange) which is a 8-bit buffer
that contains the piggy-backed data
The second field of the packet is the payload. Payload is a variable length 8-bit
buffer. The payload buffer is partitioned into two portions. The first portion of the
payload buffer, called route buff, contains the information required by the source
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routing process in order to guide the query throughout the network. We treat this
portion of the payload as a variable length array of 16-bit segments representing an
ordered sequence of node IDs along the route. The most significant bit, called CA
flag, in each segment is used as a flag which indicates whether the corresponding
node should attach its sensor data to the packet before forwarding the packet. The
remaining 15 bits represent the node ID.
The second portion of the payload buffer contains the carry-on sensor data.
This portion of the payload immediately follows is treated as a variable length
array of 8-bit segments. If the CA flag is set when a query arrives at a node, the
node will append its sensor data to this array before forwarding the packet to the
next node on the route.
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4.2.2 DAS Routing
The query’s route is constructed by the client and is put in the DAS packet be-
fore the query is released into the network. If the target of a query belongs some
anonymity set S, the route of that query consists of (1) the shortest path to some
node m0 within S, (2) a walk that starts from m0 and visits every node in S by
taking the shortest path between any two of such nodes and finally (3) the shortest
path from the last node visited in S back to the client. There exist a route which
results in the least query cost based on which ordering of nodes in S we choose
to route the packet through. However, trying to achieve this optimal route deems
impractical since it is equivalent to solving the traveling salesman problem which
is NP-complete [5]. Thus, we adopt the following simple approach of construct-
ing our routes for WSNs with arbitrary topology. We visit the members of any
anonymity set S in the order that was returned by the procedure ConstructOneS.
As for grid topology, we visit the members of S in the order that was return by the
snake-walk described in Section 4.1
Algorithm 3 An instace of DAS protocol that runs at each relay node
1: procedure receivePacket(P )
2: if P.target 6= node ID then
3: drop P
4: else if P.action = Routing then




8: new lenght← P.payload length− 1
9: for i ∈ [1, new length] do
10: Q.payload[i− 1] 8−bits←−−− P.payload[i]
11: if P.payload[0].CA then
12: Q.payload[new length]
8−bits←−−− sensor data
13: Q.payload length← new length+ 1
14: else
15: Q.payload length← new length
16: broadcast(Q,Q.payload length+ 4)
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After the construction of the initial query packet, the client injects the query
into the network. Upon DAS packets’ arrival, each node in the network performs
the steps describe in Algorithm3. This protocol is consistent with the “capabilities
of a node” describe in Section 2.2. In order to explain how this algorithm governs
the routing mechanism in the WSN, we provide the following story.
A day in the life of a DAS packet
In this example, we work closely with Figure 4.3. More so, we refer to a node
whose ID is x as mx.



































Figure 4.3: In this example, the client wants to querym4 which belong to the anonymity
set {m2,m4}. At each hop, a node strips a segment from the head of the route buff and
updates packet’s header accordingly. Moreover, nodes m2 and m4 piggy-back their data
onto the packet.
As illustrated above, the client wishes to query m4 ∈ S where S = {m2,m4}
in that specific order. Thus, the client constructs the route m1,m2,m4, m3,m1.
Next, the client creates a DAS packet and configures its header (shown as green
in the figure) by setting the destination ID of the packet to m1 and puts the rest
of route along with the appropriate CA flags (shown as small red boxes) in the
route buff (shown as blue in the figure). Each ID occupies two bytes which results
in size of 4 × 2 = 8 bytes for route buff. This value is also put into the header
as the payload size. At this point, the client broadcast the packet. m1 receives
the packet and inspects its destination field realising that this packet is in fact
intended for it. m1 detaches the first segment of the route buff and extracts the ID
of the next node on the path which is m2. m1 then creates a new packet and set
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its destination to m2. Then, m1 copies the next 6 bytes of the route buf into the
new packets route buff and sets its payload size to 6 accordingly. m1 checks the
CA flag of the stripped segment and learns that is not being queried. Therefore,
m1 proceeds to broadcast this new packet. Both m2 and m3 receive this packet,
however, m3 drops the packet since the packet destination does not match its ID.
We avoid mentioning the action of dropping an unwanted packet through the rest
of the story as is happens quite so often. Like m1, m2 strips the first segment
of the route buff, creates a new packet, sets its destination to m4 and copies the
remaining 4-bytes of the routing data into the new packet. However, by checking
the CA flag of the stripped segment, m2 notices that it has to attach its response to
the end of the route buff which is does (shown as orange in the figure). The size of
the payload is now 5. m2 adjusts payload size of the new packet and broadcasts.
m4 takes the same steps as m2. The new packet is targeted for m3 and has a
payload of size 4 with m4’s response data attached and the end of the payload.
it is easy at this point to see how DAS modifies the query packet throughout its
journey.
Piggy-backed vs. direct-routed response
In DAS protocol, we piggy-back responses onto the query as it travels through
the network. However, we justify our decision by proving that the query cost is
oblivious to the specific method we choose to route the the query-response back
to the client. When considering an individual node in the network, it is impossible
for that node to route the response back to the client using source route since it
does not have a complete map of the network. However, an individual node might
not require to know the entire route back to the client. The client can establish
a broadcast tree, i.e. a minimum spanning tree, which reaches to each individual
node and informs it about its parent along the tree. In this manner, all the node
need to do is to pass the response to its parent. Each subsequent parent, in turn,
hands the response to its own parent until the response reaches the client. We call
this method direct-routing. Direct-routing is a very limited version of table driven
routing. We show that even if direct-route method is used for query-response,
the communication cost associated with the query-response belongs to the same
asymptotic class that the query-response would have if the piggy-backed method
was used.
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Claim 1. Piggy-backed and directly routed response incur the same asymptotic
communication cost on the network.
Proof. We can completely separate the communication cost incurred by the trans-
fer of the routing information from the cost incurred by the transfer of response
data. Since the two options of routing only differ in their delivery of response
data, we solely focus on the communication cost due to the transfer of response
data.
Let the size of a single response segment be D (D as in Data). We can assert
that size of each individual direct-routed response packet is constant O(D) =
O(1). We also know that in the case direct-routed response, for each query, all the
nodes in the anonymity set S have to send their data to the client. This means that
for query anonymity a, at least a separate response packets would have to be send
to the client. The maximum number of hops for each of these packets is d the
diameter of the network. Therefore, we can conclude that in case of direct-routed
response, the communication cost imposed by the response is at most O(ad).
As with piggy-packed response, each node in the anonymity set appends its
data to the ongoing query until the query reaches the last node in the anonymity
set at which point a response data has been accumulated onto the packet. The
last packet sends these a response data back to the client which is at most d hops
away. Thus the cost imposed by the query response is also O(ad) in the case of
piggy-backed response.
We can see that for both options, the cost incurred by the response data belong
to the same asymptotic class of O(ad).
The only minor difference between the two options, with respect to the query-
response cost, is that the piggy-backed option incurs some extra. This cost occurs
while the response data are being collected and continues until the query reaches
the last node in the anonymity set. From Theorem 3, we know that the anonymity
set S can be traversed in Θ(a). Thus, we know that at least one of the responses
would be transmitted over Θ(a) hop, at least one other response would be trans-
mitted over Θ(a − 1) hop and so on. The communication cost incurred during
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this period is Θ(a2) or more accurately Θ(a2D). However, this cost gets domi-
nated by the cost imposed by the routing portion of the query Θ(a2R) where R
is the size of each route information. Θ(a2R) cost also incur for the direct route
method so it is safe to ignore this extra Θ(a2D) caused by the piggy-back method
unless R  D which is not the case for majority of WSN routing protocols. In
particular, for DAS, D is 8-bits where R is 16-bits .
Communitation cost revisited
Here, we refine our notion of the communication cost introduced in Section 3.2
in order to adapt it to our implementation of DAS protocol as we, gradually, shift
our focus from the theory to experimentation. In the following , We define the
communication cost of a query Qk that targets some node mk. Let RQK represent







where DASbc(mi, Qik) represent the number of bytes that get broadcasted ( at
line 16 of Algorithm 3 ) after applying DAS protocol at the mi upon Qik’s arrival.
Qik is the transformed version of the original Qk after i − 1 iterations of DAS
protocol.
4.3 DAS tight Upper-bound
We have established a function for the tight upper-bound of the query cost in
WSNs that employ DAS. The first purpose of this function is to show that (1) it is
congruent with the asymptotic boundary of sufficiency property of the theorems
in Section 3.4 based on the values that a assumes and (2) to demonstrate that the
collected data from the simulation does in fact fall below this upper-bound. This
function will be used in Chapter 5 to verify the experimental result.
Figure 4.4 helps us achieve this function. First, we wish to calculate the max-




















Figure 4.4: A depiction of the worst case DAS query route in a WSN with an arbitrary
topology. On its way into the network, the query alternates between route-in and data-
collection phases. Data-collection phases are displayed within dashed regions. The query
travels down each region and carries the response data on its way up. Once all the data
has been collected, the query make its way to the client i.e. the route-out phase.
which is furthest from the server. Throughout the following we assume that the
size of the anonymity set which holds mk is exactly a. We can divide the query’s
journey into three separate phase: route-in phase, data-collection phase, route-out
phase. During the route-in phase, the query travels through nodes that are not
members of the anonymity set. This phase continues until all the response data
are collected. During the data-collection phase, the query travels through mem-
bers of the anonymity set and collects the required response data. This phase,
also, continues until all the response data are collected. The route-out phase start
after all the response data are collected at which point the query make its way
back to the client. Due to the way the anonymity sets are arranged in arbitrary
topology, the anonymity set might be broken into k disjoint chunks of nodes with
sizes a1, a2, . . . , ak such that a = a1 + a2 + ... + ak. This causes the query to
frequently alternate between the route-in and data-collection phases as opposed to
square grid topology where it completes the route-in phase and then moves on to
the data-collection phase. Therefore, the number of hops the query take during its
route-in phase can be broken into k parts d1, d2, . . . , dk. Let’s’ say that the query
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takes din hops through its combined route-in phases where:
din = (d1 + 1) + (d2 + 1) + · · ·+ dk
Claim 2. din ≤ d where d is the diameter of the network.
Proof. For the purposes of this proof, we can safely assume that the path that a
packet takes to reach any node in the network is a subset of the same spanning tree
T used by ConstructAllS procedure to create the anonymity sets. The reason that
we can safely make such an assumption is that we know that at least this spanning
three does exist, otherwise we wouldn’t be able to arrange the anonymity sets.
We can’t make any assumptions regarding the existence any other edges that the
network graph offers besides the edges in T although they might actually exist.
Furthermore, these paths are the shortest path from the server to every other node
in the network since T is a minimum spanning tree. This leads to the conclusion
that din ≤ d since din is in fact the shortest from the server to the last member of
the anonymity set and by definition it cannot be longer than the diameter of the
network.
During the ith partial data-collection phase, the query travels downward on the
branch that contains ai nodes for ai consecutive hops and starts collecting data
while traveling upward for another ai hops. Therefore, the number of hops that
query takes through its combined data-collection phase is:
2(a1 + a2 + ...+ 2ak) = 2a
Finally, the maximum number of hops taken during the route-out phase is dout
which bounded by the diameter of the network. Therefore the maximum number
of hops that a query takes in the network in the worst case scenario is:
l = din + 2a+ dout ≤ 2d+ 2a
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We can calculate the cost incurred by the three sections of a DAS packet:
header, route and data, separately throughout query’s journey. For simplicity, we
consider the size of the header to be H , the size of individual routing segments to
be R and the size of individual data segments to be D anonymity set. The header
information is transmitted for every hop:
A ← Hl = 4(2d+ 2a) = 8d+ 8a
The routing information transmitted for the first hop is l and for each sub-








2i = 4d2 + 2d+ 8ad+ 2a+ 4a2
The sensor data is collected over the span of 2a hops. For each single data
segment, the earlier it is collected the more overhead it imposes on the network
since it has to be carried for a longer distance. Thus in the worst case, all a
data segments are collected in the first a hops during which the size of the data
continuously increments by one segment per each hop and then all those a data




Di) + a(a+ d)D = 1.5a2 + 0.5a+ ad
Thus the maximum total number of bytes transferred is:
A + B + C = 4d2 + 10d+ 9ad+ 10.5a+ 5.5a2
We achieve the final form of upper-bound for query cost in arbitrary topolo-
gies:
uba(d, a) = 4d
2 + 10d+ 9ad+ 10.5a+ 5.5a2 (4.2)
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Tight upper-bound for square grid
We thrive to construct a similar tight upper-bound for WSNs with square grid
topology. Similar to our approach in dealing with arbitrary graph topology, we can
divide query’s journey into three phases of route-in, data-collection and phase-
out. There are two main difference between square grid and arbitrary topology. In
square grid topology:
1. The DAS query completes the entire route-in phase without interruption
through d1 consecutive hops where d1<d
2. The DAS query completes the entire data-collection phase without interrup-
tion through a consecutive hops
This leaves us with the following maximum number of hops in the worst case
scenario:
l = din + a+ dout ≤ 2d+ a
Figure 4.5 demonstrates these aspects of query’s journey through square grid
topology. Again, we can assess the costs incur by each of the fields of the packet,
header A , route B and data C separately :











Di] + adD = 0.5a2 + 0.5a+ ad
Thus the maximum total number of bytes transferred is:
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A + B + C = 4d2 + 10d+ 5ad+ 5.5a+ 1.5a2
We achieve the final form of upper-bound for query cost in square grid topolo-
gies:
ubg(d, a) = 4d









Figure 4.5: A depiction of the worst case DAS query route in a WSN with square grid
topology. During its uninterrupted route-in phase, the query travels to the first mem-
ber of the anonymity set (based on its respective snake-walk ordering). During its data-
collection, the query visits the members of the anonymity set through a consecutive hops.




We have conducted a simulation-based empirical evaluation in support of our ana-
lytical results from the previous sections. Our particular intent with the empirical
evaluation is to validate the assertions on sufficiency in Theorems 4 and 5 and
corollary 1. That is, we simulate the DAS protocol, measure the communication-
cost it incurs in various settings, and observe that it is indeed upper-bounded as
the analytical assertions tell us.
In Section 5.1 we explain how we generated the WSN topologies on which we
run the simulation for various scenarios. In Section 5.2, we discuss our simulation
setup and the scenarios that we have simulated. Finally, in Section 5.3, we present
the simulation results and explain our observations.
5.1 Random Network Generation
Our experimentation required a large number of randomly generated WSN topolo-
gies. Some scenarios required hundreds of random topologies that share certain
properties such as size n or diameter d or both. We use random geometric graphs
to construct random WSNs topologies required for our experimentation. A ran-
dom geometric graph is a random undirected graph drawn on a bounded region,
e.g. the unit square [0, 1)2. The x and y coordinates of each node are chosen
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uniformly at random from [0, 1). Two nodes u and v are connected if and only if
their Euclidean is less than or equal to some designated value r:
||u− v||2 ≤ r
However, we have to enforce the following three properties onto the generated
network:
1. The network is connected
2. The size of the network is n
3. The diameter of the network is d
To enforce the first two property of the network, we adopt the following simple
strategy. We keep adding new node to the graph and merging those components
that become connected at each step until the size of the giant component is larger
than n. We call this phase the bulk-up phase. Figure 5.1 can help us better under-
stand this procedure.
Next we remove all other components of the graph except for the giant com-
ponent. This will be our main graph. Finally, we continuously remove safely
removable nodes from the graph until we reach the desired size of n. We call
this phase the trim-down phase. A safely removable node is a node that will not
undermine the connectivity of the graph if removed from the graph. At each step,
we find the set of safely removable nodes Srmv, choose a random node from this
set and remove that node from the main graph. Srmv can be obtain by subtracting
the set of articulation nodes Sart from the set of all graph nodes V :
Srmv = V/Sart
Figure 5.2 shows some examples of articulation points.
The size of the diameter of the network is calculated using the Floyd-Warshal
algorithm[5]. There is no deterministic approach of enforcing the size of the net-























Figure 5.1: This is an illustration of bulk-up procedure. The desired network size is 25.
At step i of the process, C6 is the giant component with size 10. We add the ith new node
which connects C2 and C3 and forms the new giant component C7 of size 12. We add the
(i + 1)th new node connecting C5, C6 and C7 and forming the new giant component C8
of size 30 >25. At this point we are done and C8 is the candidate graph.
network diameter by adjusting the value of r recursively. Smaller r results in





This is a good starting point. The rational behind choosing this value is that
if n nodes where uniformly arranged in a unit square, each two adjacent nodes
would lay 1√




Figure 5.2: Example of articulation points in a graph. Removing any of the articulation
nodes (red) renders the graph disconnected.
create a new random network and calculate its diameter d´. If d´<d, we have to
decrease r. We decrease r by a random amount chosen with normal distribution
of mean 0 and standard deviation of:
σ = |d− d´
d
|
If d´>d, we have to increase r. We increase r by the same value described
above. Note that the closer we get to d, the smaller the change in the value of r;
Therefore, we greedily move towards the optimal value of r which maximizes our
chances of finding the desired diameter. Friedrich et al. in their work [8] offer
an estimation for the value of d given n, the size of a random geometric graph,
and the value of r. However, their approach is not applicable in the context of
our intentions. They estimate the diameter of the giant component of a random
geometric graph of size n where we ensure that the giant component itself is at
least as large as n and then we trim it down. More so, Friedrich requires that r is
larger than the connectivity threshold. In our case, for relatively large values of d,
it is necessary that r fall below the connectivity threshold.
Another important aspect of our approach is that we do not discard the unde-
sirable networks created during the continuous runs of this process. We save and
archive these networks. In certain cases, it takes tens of tries before we achieve
a specific network with some desired n and d. By saving all those unwanted net-
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works throughout the process, over time, we accumulate a massive database of
networks with a variety n and d combinations which are reusable for future sce-
narios. This greatly improves the overall efficiency of random network generation
process. The details of process described above is provided in the Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Random network Generation
1: procedure constructRandomWSN(n, d)
2: G← searchNetworkDatabase(n, d)
3: if G = ∅ then
4: r´ ← r ← adjustR(n, d)
5: repeat




10: dr ← d−d´
d
11: s← |dr|/dr
12: r´ ← r − s ∗ randomNormalDstr(0, |dr|)
13: until d´ = d
14: return G as N
15: procedure bulkUp(n, r)
16: C∗ ← ∅ . C∗ is the current giant component
17: while |C∗|<n do
18: choose random x, y ∈ [0, 1]
19: m← createNewNode(x, y)
20: S ← neighboursOf (m, r) ∪m
21: C ← ⋃
mi∈S
C(mi) . C(mi) is the component containing mi
22: if |C∗|<|C| then
23: C∗ ← C
24: return C∗ as G
25: procedure trimDown(G, n)
26: while |G| 6= n do
27: Satr ← findSafeToRemoveNodes(G)
28: choose random m ∈ Satr and remove m from G
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5.2 Simulation Environment, Setup and Scenario
We use Tossim[11] running on TinyOS 2.1.2 framework to simulate DAS. Net-
works are generated in a homogenous manner using MICAz nodes. Each node
is assigned a unique 15-bits ID. TinyOS’s Active Message[2] interface is used for
data transmission between the nodes. All nodes receive their neighbors’ transmis-
sion at -10 dBm. Also, we use Casino Lab noise trace 1 as the background noise
model. This noise model provides a quite environment for wireless communica-
tion. Furthermore, since we run the simulation for each query separately, there is
at most one active instance of transmission at any moment. This arrangement pre-
vents any packet collision. This combination of configurations provides an strong
enough signal from the receiver node’s perspective that the possibility of packet
loss is almost non-existent. We would like to minimized the possibility of packet
drop in order to focus solely on DAS behavior rather than communication quality
of the network. Throughout all the scenarios described below, we use the notion of
query cost described the Equation . Tossim provides us with facilities that enable
us to accurately measure the number of byte that each node broadcasts.
In a WSN with arbitrary topology, there are three acting variables that deter-
mine how DAS behaves with respect to trade-off between query-anonymity and
communication-cost. These three variables are n, the size of the network, a, the
size of the anonymity set and, d the diameter of the. We isolate the effects each
of these factors have on the query cost into a separate scenarios. In all scenario,
we calculate the cost of the most expensive query in the network based on the
notion of cost defined in Equation 5.2. The most expensive query in the context
of arbitrary topologies is the node that its distance from the server is exactly the
size of the diameter of the network.
1. Variable anonymity set size a:
In this scenario, we apply DAS to four different networks that share the
same values of n = 100 and d = 20. We simulate and record the cost
of the most expensive query in each of the four networks as we increase a
the size of the anonymity set. Finally for each a, we average the costs of
1There are two noise traces provided by Tossim suit: Meyer library and Casino lab. Among
the two, Casino lab offers a much higher SNR.
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these four individual cases and show that it falls under the asymptotic upper-
bound. The result of this experiment is shown in Figure 5.3 and discussed
in Section 5.3.
2. Variable diameter size d:
In this scenario, for each value of d ∈ [5, 10, 15, ..., 50], we generate four
different networks that share the same values of a = 25 and n = 100. For
each value of d, we simulate and record the cost of the most expensive query
in each of the four networks. Finally for each d, we average the costs of
these four individual cases and show that it falls under the asymptotic upper-
bound. The result of this experiment is shown in Figure 5.4 and discussed
in Section 5.3.
3. Variable network size n:
In this scenario, for each value of n ∈ [100, 110, 120, ..., 270], we create four
different network that share the same values for a = 25 and d = 100. For
each value of n, we simulate and record the cost of the most expensive query
in each of the four networks. Finally for each n, we average the costs of
these four individual cases and show that it falls under the asymptotic upper-
bound. The result of this experiment is shown in Figure 5.5 and discussed
in Section 5.3.
In the case of square grid, there are only two acting variables that dictate
DAS’s behaviour with respect to trade-off between query anonymity and com-
munication cost. These two variables are n, the size of the network, and a, the
size of the anonymity set. We explore three values of n = 100, 225 and 576,
which correspond to 10 × 10, 15 × 15 and 24 × 24 square grids. For each val-
ues of n we steadily increase the size of anonymity set a. We wish to observe
that DAS displays a consistent behavior across various network sizes. For square
grid topology, we simulate DAS under only one scenarios. In this scenario, we
simulates the most expensive query. The most expensive query is the query that
targets the node that is furthest from the server in terms of Manhattan distance.
We position the server and the target of the query on the opposite corners of the
square grid. This arrangement gives us the maximum distance between the server
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and the target of the query. The experimental results after running this scenario is
shown in Figure 5.6 and will be discussed in Section 5.3.
Limits of the simulation tool and other considerations
TinyOS’s radio modules imposes a maximum size on the packet size during
any one instance of transmission. TinyOS documents does not specify an exact
value for this maximum. However, through trial and error, we found this maxi-
mum to be about 215 ∼ 225 bytes . If a packet is larger than this maximum, it
must be broken into smaller fragments which would then be transmitted over mul-
tiple instances of packet transmission. We decided not to fragment DAS packets
in our simulation. A ramification of such a decision is that the length of the route
of any simulated DAS query would be bounded by ∼ 110 hops. We have taken
this into consideration for the simulated topologies.
Another important consideration is that, when constructing anonymity sets,
consecutive values of a in bounded intervals result in the exact same anonymity
set arrangement. This circumstance is the direct result of the way that we obtain





. This fact in combination
with our method of constructing anonymity sets (described in Algorithm 2 ) will
result in the same sets arrangement for all values of a within each interval. For
example, for n = 100, for all values of a ∈ [21, 25] we get k = 4 and therefore
the same set arrangement. Similarly, for all values of a ∈ [26, 33] we get k = 3,
for all values of a ∈ [34, 50] we get k = 2 and so on. Therefore, in the cases of
“Variable anonymity set size a” and “Square Grid” scenarios, there is no point in
simulating all values of a that belong to the same interval. We only choose the




We can see that the function ubg shown in Equation 4.2 is strictly increasing
with respect to both variables a and d. Hence, if we keep the variable d = d∗
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fixed, for a1 ≤ a2 ⇒ uba(a1, d∗) ≤ ubg(a2, d∗). Similarly, if a = a∗ is fixed, for
d1 ≤ d2 ⇒ uba(a∗, d1) ≤ ubg(a∗, d2). Having these properties, we can infer that
for a ≤ d, the worst case cost cwst:
cwst ≤ uba(a, d) ≤ uba(d, d) = 18.5d2 + 20.5d (5.1)
We can conclude, in WSNs with arbitrary topology, that for a ∈ [1,Θ(d)] we
have cwst ∈ O(d2) which is aligned with sufficient property of Theorem 4. The
results of the simulation of the “Variable anonymity set size a” scenario is shown
in Figure 5.3. We can see that the collected data for any a ≤ 20 falls below the
proposed tight upper-bound shown by the flat line in the plot. Similarly, for a>d,
the worst case cost cwst is:
cwst ≤ uba(a, d) ≤ uba(d, d) = 18.5a2 + 20.5a (5.2)
Therefore, when a ∈ [Θ(d), n] we have cwst ∈ O(a2) which is aligned with
sufficient property of Theorem 5. Again, we can see that in Figure 5.3 the col-
lected data for any a>20 also falls below the proposed tight upper-bound.
Furthermore, by exploring the results from simulating the “Variable diame-
ter size d” scenario, we can show that changing the network diameter d impacts
DAS’s behavior in the manner predicted by the Theorems4 and 5. If we fix the
value of the anonymity set size a, we would expect the cost for d ∈ [1,Θ(a)] to
be asymptotically bounded by O(a2). Using Equation 4.2 and the same logical
reasoning we used for the “variable a” scenario to achieve the relation 5.1 we can
assert that this is in fact the case and that the cost is asymptotically bounded by
O(a2). Equivalently, for d ∈ [Θ(a), n], we would expect the cost to be asymp-
totically bounded by O(d2). Relation confirms this our prediction which further
verifies the validity of Theorems4 and 5. Figure 5.4 illustrates the results after
running the simulation for the “Variable diameter size d” scenariofor n = 150
and a = 25. We can observe that the collected data in all cases falls below the
predicted asymptotic boundaries.
Finally, Figure 5.5 present the simulation results for the “Variable network






















Avgerage of the Individual cases
Upper Bound
Figure 5.3: Our empirical results for worst case query cost in arbitrary topologies with
varying anonymity, a but fixed d, n. Red crosses on each point of the “Anonymity Set Size
(a)” axis correspond to the worst case query costs for four different networks and their
average value is represented by a blue circle. All values of a use the same four network
since the value of a affect the set arrangements and not the topology of the network graph.
the WSN, i.e. the number of nodes n does not impact the communication cost as
long as as the diameter d and the anonymity set size a are the same. Thus, we can
safely assert that in arbitrary topologies, the communication cost is independent
of network size and only depends on the degree of the query anonymity and the
diameter of the network.
A closer inspection of the function uba reveals yet another, more implicit, as-
pect of the trade-off between communication cost and query anonymity. If we fix
the value of a, uba becomes a function of the network diameter d. We notice that
the WSN designer can adjust the communication cost by modifying d in much
the same way that she would through tweaking a. This is a valuable character-






















Avgerage of the Individual cases
Upper Bound
Figure 5.4: Our empirical results for worst case query cost in arbitrary topologies with
varying diameter, d but fixed a, n. Like Figure 5.3 red crosses on the “Diameter (d)”
corresponds to the worst case query costs for four different networks and the blue circle
is their average. However, unlike Figure 5.3, for each d there is a different set of four
arbitrary network since d affects the topology of the networks.
an specific constraint on communication cost, she can maximize the anonymity
by minimizing the network diameter. In simple words, denser networks result in
smaller diameter which allows for higher anonymity and sparser network result
in larger diameters and penalize the design for desired anonymity requirements.
This becomes specially useful when we realize that DAS is scalable with respect
to network size. In other words, for larger values of a cost is independent of the
number of nodes in WSN. We can add new nodes to the network without worrying
about cost increase as long as the diameter of network does not increase.
In the case of square grid topology, we can see that the function ubg shown
in Equation 4.3 is also strictly increasing with respect to both variables a and d.





















Avgerage of the Individual Cases
Upper Bound
Figure 5.5: Our empirical results for worst case query cost for four networks with differ-
ent arbitrary topologies with varying network size, n but fixed a, d. Similar to Figure 5.4,
for each n there is a different set of four arbitrary network since n affects the topology of
the networks.
the worst case cost cwst:
cwst ≤ ubg(a, d) ≤ ubg(d, d) = 10.5d2 + 15.5d
However, in square grid topology, the value of d is directly tied to the size of




Therefore, we rephrase the statements above by substituting 2(
√
n− 1) for d.
For a ≤ 2(√n− 1), the worst case cost cwst:
50
cwst ≤ 42n− 53
√
n+ 11 (5.3)
This means for a ∈ [1,Θ(√n)] we have cwst ∈ O(n) which is aligned with
sufficiency property of Corollary 1 . After simulating the worst-case scenario
with three different WSN networks of sizes of n1 = 100, n2 = 225 and n3 = 576
(i.e 10 × 10, 15 × 15 and 24 × 24), the collected results verifies that the worst
case query cost for all three networks falls under the calculated upper-bound. The
upper-bound valuse for the thee network size are ub1 = 3681, ub2 = 8666 and
ub3 = 22931. These upper-bounds are shown by flat-lines in Figure 5.6. We can
see that in all cases, when a ≤ 2(√n−1) , i.e. when a ∈ [1,Θ(√n)], the collected
data falls below the calculated upper-bound.
We use the same logic for when a>d and conclude:
cwst ≤ ubg(a, d) ≤ ubg(a, a) = 10.5a2 + 15.5a (5.4)
This means for a ∈ [Θ(√n), n] we have cwst ∈ O(a2) which is aligned with
sufficiency property of Corollary 1. Figure 5.6 illustrates that for all three net-
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Figure 5.6: Our empirical results for worst and average case query cost in square grid
topology. Three networks of sizes n = 100, 225 and 576. Their respective diameters are




We have analysed the trade-off between query-anonymity and communication-
cost in the context of wireless sensor networks. For an unconditional notion of
query-anonymity [1], we have established what we call the limits of this trade-off.
We began with source-routed connected undirected graphs. In such settings, the
necessary and sufficient communication-cost for achieving query-anonymity a ∈
[1, d] is Ω(d2) and O(d2) respectively, where d is the diameter (longest shortest-
path) of the graph. For a ∈ [d, n], we have shown that the corresponding costs are
Ω(a2) andO(a2) respectively. We have also conducted a simulation using Tossim,
which provides empirical validation for our assertions on sufficiency.
There is considerable scope for future work. One is to explore table-based
routing which is an alternative to source-routing. That is, the client does not
provide a route; rather, the nodes in the wireless sensor network are capable of
routing by themselves. In this case, the trade-off between communication-cost
and query-anonymity does change in particular cases. Another involves incorpo-
rating other parameters into the problem that are relevant. For example, it can
be argued that grouping adjacent wireless sensor nodes into the same anonymity
set may not provide sufficient query-anonymity. This may be because simply the
attacker knowing that a set of adjacent nodes are the targets of queries may reveal
information we seek to protect, in certain applications.
Consequently, we may want to incorporate location-sensitivity in our notion
of query-anonymity. This may require, for example, that nodes that are grouped
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together in an anonymity set are necessarily far apart in the topology of the net-
work. It will then be interesting to ask the same questions that we ask in this





We analyse the trade-off between communication-cost and query-anonymity in
the context of wirless sensor networks. To our knowledge, this trade-off was
first pointed out in the work of Carbunar et al. [6]. That also happens to be
the work to which ours is related most closely. That work proposes notions of
query-anonymity, two of which we have addressed in this work and argued to
be deficient. We have proposed an unconditional notion in lieu. Also, though
the work of Carbunar et al. [6] point out the trade-off, they do not analyze it.
Specifically, they do not point out the necessary and sufficient communication-
cost as we do to achieve a certain query-anonymity. The work of De Cristofaro
et al. [11] also is related to our work in that that work also considers query-
anonymity. However, the threat model is weaker than ours. Also, the trade-off
between communication- cost and query-anonymity is not analyzed as we do. Our
notion of query-a-anonymity is related to the work such as that of Serjantov and
Danezis [24], and Pfitzmann and Hansen [21], which propose quantitative notions
of anonymity. The former work points out that work prior to it on quantifying
anonymity based on anonymity sets, for example, [10], is deficient. We point out
that our notion of an anonymity set in the context of the DAS protocol does not
have those deficiencies. Our work generalizes the work of Serjantov and Danezis
[24] in that we allow a, the query-anonymity, to take on any value in [1, n]. How-
ever, our work is more limited in that we address query-anonymity in the context
of wireless sensor networks only. The work of Serjantov and Danezis [24] also
does not consider the trade-off as we do. The work of Pfitzmann and Hansen [21]
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mentions a variant of what we call the DAS protocol. They also propose notions
of anonymity, but precisely as we do, and also do not consider the trade-off issue
as we do. Certainly, our notion of query anonymity has commonalities with other
prior work, for example, [3, 4, 12, 15, 16], in that it follows analogous approaches
to what is used in the formalization of semantically secure encryption [14] to de-
fine the receiver anonymity notion. We see this as a validation for the intuitive
appeal of our notion. As we mention earlier, we claim our notion as novel only
in the context of query-anonymity. Furthermore, our focus is beyond characteriz-
ing a notion of anonymity; we seek to study the trade-off that is the focus of this
paper. Of course, our work is also related to work on privacy and anonymity in
the context of wireless sensor networks, such as [25, 28]. The work of Carbunar
et al. [6] provides an excellent overview of the work in that area. The work of
Shao et al. [25] addresses a weaker attacker than we do in that the wireless sen-
sor network is assumed to be trusted from the standpoint of disclosure. Also, the
trade-off between communication-cost and query-anonymity is not their focus, as
in our paper. This is also the case with the work of Yang et al. [28], whose focus,
rather, is the placement of what they call proxies, which generate dummy traffic
to provide anonymity for sensor nodes.
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